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Customer Reviews
BOYD: An overworked 'David vs. Goliath' story that misses the mark.
Overall, this book has more merit as the basis for someone interested in producing a 'Made for T.V. movie', then it does for anyone seriously interested in COL Boyd's career and his contribution to the art or war.
In 'BOYD', Coram attempts to portray COL Boyd's career (1952-1975) as a single faceted, 'fighter pilot's crusade' against the inept and corupt Defense bureaucracy.
This portrayal ignores the significant influence that 'Nuclear Brinkmanship' had on defense policy and military thinking at the time of the Cold War (1947-1991) and results in a substantially biased and diminished work that all too often relies upon innuendo, conjecture and exagerations in order to preserve the author's story line over any form of historical objectivity.
During the Cold War, the major threat and focus of the senior military and civilian leadership of this country was on the 'nuclear triad' (i.e. Strategic Bombers, ICBMs & Nuke Subs), not on tactical fighter combat. Against this backdrop, Coram's antithesis, "Bigger-Higher-Faster-Farther" while making for a very poor fighter, does describe the performance parameters that could lead to an exceptional 'bomber interceptor', that would address one of these three threats to our national security. A part of the story that Coram gives no attention too and a fine example of the lack of objectivity that permeates this book.
Finally, two of COL Boyd's most important contributions to the art of war, 'The OODA Loop' and 'Destruction and Creation' (the former of which had a significant influence on the development of the Land Warfare Doctrine that defeated Iraq twice in the last two decades), only get cursory coverage in this book at best.
As important as Coram makes Boyd's E-M theory (i.e. a technical measurement of aircraft performance) out to be , its influence and impact on aerial warfare and the art of war is mostly technical, of which the benefits it will provide, can only be temporary at best.
Even now, technical improvements in 'air to air' and 'missile engagement' technology (i.e. Radar, AIM-7s, AIM-9s and even pilotless aircraft,...etc.) are such that it is possible to forsee the day when these advances will succeed in eliminating most, if not all of the area of the fighter engagement envelope that E-M was created to address.
When that happens, Robert Coram's book which is mainly aimed at the controversial aspect of COL Boyd's E-M contribution, will have missed the mark of how it could have told the story about "The 'Man' That Did Change the Art of War".
