Pour compléter les propos d'Aquila, en France, pour soutenir un soldat il faut 5 logisticiens, l'Armée US, c'est 10 logisticiens derrière...
De plus, rien qu'à la quantité, il faut rajouter l'organisation vitale de la chaîne d'approvisionnement extrait d'un rapport publié par un Officier Supérieur & Logisticien de l'US Army à propos de la 1ère Guerre du Golfe :
"We found that our logistics system is far from simple. The reason is the multitude and complexity of the weapon systems being supported on the battlefield. The great array of support units and automated systems required to support a corps with both light and heavy divisions creates an almost untenable structure for support. We found few uncomplicated processes that supported units could use to obtain relief. Logistics staffs were unquestionably the busiest staff elements in the theater. Of all the battlefield operating systems, CSS planning and execution required the most elaborate staff supervision.
We learned that to keep things simple, logisticians must focus on the most critical supply and distribution aspects of combat logistics; namely, fuel, ammunition, rations, repair parts, and movement control. Once these activities are under control, others can be tackled. The list of logistics issues is never wholly resolved but merely rolls on, as one issue after another surfaces. Simplicity is achieved when logisticians find an effective means of prioritizing the issues confronting them and then concentrate on finding solutions.
Proud as we are of the logistics accomplishments of the Gulf War, an evaluation of our logistics planning and performance measured against the Principles of Logistics may allow us to make smart changes in anticipation of future conflicts. Two major conclusions may be derived from this analysis. First, had Iraq attacked early in our buildup, our lack of sustainment might have become the reason for our defeat. Balancing the flow of sustainment with the strategic deployment of combat power—in other words, equivalence—would have been the lesson learned in that case.
Second, had the ground war exceeded 100 hours, the XVIII Airborne Corps (and hence the coalition forces) would have needed an unplanned operational pause to allow logistics to catch up to the combat advance. The immediate problem would have been the cycle time for GS fuel haulers: they could not travel long distances, back and forth, fast enough to maintain the momentum of our attacking forces. In reflection, this was clearly a risk; only the shortness of the ground war made offensive logistics support "feasible." ALOG"
En gros, avec la grande hétérogènéité des équipements rendait la structure d'approvisionnement intennable, quelques solutions simples permettait d'approvisionner les unités, l'état-major Logistique étant sans aucun doute, le plus occupé de tous avec un planning des plus complexes.
Le classement par priorité des matériels à permis de faciliter le travail.
2 Conclusion majeures:
1. Si l'Irak avait attaqué au début de l'acheminement des forces, le manque de soutien aurait été la raison de notre défaite.
2. Si l'offensive terrestre avait duré plus de 100 heures, elle aurait été stoppée pour assurer le réaprovisionnement, seul l'arrêt prématuré des combats a écarté cette solution.