Ca date, un peu, c'est en anglais, c'est un article publié sur ce site officiel : http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... .htm#kross
(c'est un .mil, dire si c'est du sérieux
)Ca s'appelle "Military Reform: Past and Present" et ça taille des croupières aux "Reformers" ("Réformateurs") qui avaient tendance à faire du lobying anti F-15 ( F-111) et pro F-5 à la fin des années 70/ début 80... Ca balance évidemment pas mal de noms plus ou moins connus (Boyd...) et ça ressemble un peu à une sorte de tentative de contrôle de "chisme" avec un petit ton d'inquisition très modérée, mais qui ne rigole pas quand même.
Au final, c'est assez long et par moments un poil barbant, mais ça illustre bien l'autre coté du miroir : à savoir une tentative de contrer la fameuse "Fighter Mafia" qui essayait à l'époque de tirer les leçons de la guerre du Vietnam et de l'échec des gros F-4 très avancés technologiquement face aux Migs (21) beaucoup plus rudimentaires mais aussi adaptés à leur role.
Au final, la "Fighter Mafia" a gagné, du moins en bonne partie, dans la mesure ou cette bande de furieux investis d'un mission a réussi sans reculer devant aucun moyen à imposer un apparei, petit, manoeuvrable, équipé de missiles IR / canon, bon marché et donc disponible en quantité importantes pour assurer une forte supériorité numérique locale : le F-16A.
Je dis en bonne partie parce que la mission principale des F-16 US reste l'attaque au sol. Chose démontrée dans leur emploi pendant la 1ère guerre du Golfe ainsi que dans le cursus des pilotes US de Viper (vous êtes là d'abord pour bomber, les pilotes d'Eagles font le air-air, si ça dégénère, vous aurez le droit de jouer vous aussi... mais jusque là, en avant les muds... )
C'est quand même amusant de se rappeler qu'un des appareils les plus réussi de l'histoire de l'aviation a du être imposé à l'état major de l'Air Force (ou au moins du TAC) qui ne voulait pas en entendre parler à l'origine : pas assez cher, pas assez gros, pas assez compliqué...
Je vous mets ci dessous un petit extrait de la fin du document, de ce qui est peut être le plus intéressant "techniquement" :
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The Myths
...
Myth: History shows that numbers are the dominant factor in air combat.
Alternative: The power of Colonel Boyd’s tactical insights notwithstanding, the most decisive factor in air combat in Korea may well have been the quality built into the F-86. Its hydraulic controls enabled the F-86 to change combat maneuvers faster—the origin and heart of Boyd’s theories — than the MiG-15, which had only manual wire and rod controls.
Other factors are important. In Korea we achieved a 10 to 1 kill ratio by fighting over neutral territory near the range limit of the MiG. We fought against a backward nation probably too far out in front of itself in technology with the MiG-15 and ground radar. In Korea, we were not numerically dominant, but the qualitative superiority of our pilots gave us a considerable edge.
By contrast, in World War II and Vietnam we achieved only a 2 to 1 kill ratio. We were numerically dominate, posing many targets to an enemy who chose his battles carefully. Most important, we carried the fight to the enemy’s heartland, into his GCI/ground defense/interceptor net. Perhaps these factors are as important as numbers. Korea is not the simple base line it seems.
Myth: Air Combat Evaluation/Air Intercept and Missile Evaluation (ACEVAL/AIMVAL) is the true predictor for modern air combat, and only the Reformers know how to interpret it.
Alternative: The Air Force and Navy learned more lessons from ACEVAL/AIMVAL than did the Reformers. First, we learned that our current medium-range missile was a handicap to our longer-range shooters, the F-15/F-14s. It was slow, and it drew our best aircraft into visual dogfights unnecessarily. This prove a major disadvantage particularly when faced with a revolutionary, point-and-shoot weapon:
the fast, all-aspect infrared missile. As a result, we initiated the advanced medium range air-to-air missile program to produce a fast launch-and-leave missile for firing beyond visual range. Second, we validated that enemy GCI has to be neutralized. Third, we confirmed how important it is to retain first-shot advantage over a numerically superior enemy. Fourth, we learned the need for new tactics. Fifth, we learned the importance of beyond-visual-range identification. Sixth, we learned the importance of superior pilot skills. Even so, the F-15s and F-14s had a superior exchange ratio to the F-5 in ACEVAL/AIMVAL—a battle fought over neutral territory in clear weather by pilots of equal skill well within range of all aircraft.
The Reformers learned different lessons: buy only cheap, visual dogfighters and abandon the beyond-visual-range air battle as a hopeless concept.
Fallows says that intangible factors are often decisive. He is right, but he ignores some obvious ones. Israeli experience belies the ACEVAL conclusion that, in many air battles, numbers dominate and complex weapons are a handicap. The Israelis have defeated numerically superior enemies, whipping them with U.S. aircraft and missiles that the Reformers oppose. And, at this writing, the F-15 is still undefeated in air combat. In fact, the Israelis have repeatedly beaten air forces which were heavily equipped with the
MiG-21, an aircraft almost identical to the Reformers’ favorite, the F-5.
The Reformers’ overemphasis on ACEVAL/AIMVAL distorts the scope of modern theater war. They would have the public believe that the visual air battle is the decisive activity. It is crucial, but so are other missions. Historically, 90 percent of all aircraft are lost to ground fire. We must prepare well for many missions under many conditions.
Myth: Compared to simpler aircraft of World War II and Korea, today’s complex weapons are in a poor state of readiness and are virtually unmaintainable.
Alternative: This is a very large myth, unsupported by combat experience. Sortie rates in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam did not exceed 1.0 sorties per day for any 30-day period. Modern aircraft can sustain higher rates. Last year, the Air Force demonstrated that its two most sophisticated all-weather fighters, the F-111 and F-15, could exceed their planned rates. Despite being limited to partial operations by the host European nations, the F-111 flew twice its wartime rate, and the F-15 averaged more than three sorties daily for two weeks.
Fallows uses a chart to indict F-15 maintainability. Even the old data used showed the F-15 broke down less often and required less manpower than its predecessor, the F-4. The F-15 has continued to mature, and more recent data show the newer F-15C/Ds require about half the maintenance of the F-4E.
Fallows cites Colonel Everest Riccioni’s argument that the F-15s are a "phantom fleet," producing only one-tenth the sorties as an equal-cost F-5E force. But his cost figures and sortie rates are debatable. Slight adjustments in the ratios yield an equal number of sorties for both planes. Still, the number of raw sorties per dollar is a poor measure—combat-effective sorties is the goal. The F-5E is a point defense interceptor capable of guarding a small area on a nice day. How useful would it have been in the Battle of the Bulge when air power was crucial? Good weather fighters flew .5-.8 sorties per day in December 1943-June 1944.
Myth: The United States Air Force pursues technology for its own sake to the exclusion of quantity and simplicity.
Alternative: We pursue sophistication when needed for the mission. Our all-weather air-to-air fighter (the F-15) and our all-weather attack aircraft (the F-111) constitute only 19 percent of our fighter force. From 1975 to 1986, we will modernize our force with F-15s, F-16s, and A-l0s: about 3000 aircraft. Only about 800 will be F-15s, the rest are simple, basic day-visual fighters. We will selectively modify some of the F-16s and A-10s with extra capability, but only as needed.
Ainsi que le ptit coté "ordre et discipline" (ce qui se comprend très bien vu la situation à l'époque)
!Dealing with Reform
These and other myths demonstrate the lack of analytical balance in National Defense. That Fallows and the Reformers have gone unchallenged is testimony to both their bureaucratic skill and the apathy of the officer corps.
Still, the Reformers’ movement is a fact of life. The military services must deal with it effectively. Otherwise, the military will jeopardize its role in determining strategy, tactics, and force structure within the U.S. defense establishment.
There are some important steps that the military services should take in the face of attempted reform.
* Try to control it. Keep it evolutionary not revolutionary.
* Keep an open mind, evaluate all ideas, and apply the good ones with vigor. Find the common ground and go after it.
* Know how to absorb the unjustified punch. Articulate very clearly the reasons why we do what we do and why some suggestions of the Reformers are counterproductive to the military’s mission. Do this in a timely way.
* Establish the means and resources to get a balanced view to decision-makers and the public.
* Tolerate, encourage and reward the military visionary in the officer corps.
Like it or not, National Defense is with us. Its controversial nature has generated reactions which vary from reverence to revulsion. In the final analysis, National Defense is an important statement of the Reformers’ case, and it is receiving wide acclaim. In this sense, it is the most significant book on defense in recent years.
The U.S. defense establishment always needs reform—but in moderation. The fear of many professionals is that these particular Reformers have gone beyond the bounds of moderation in both method and objective. The Reformers might better be called the "Replacers," because they would have the military trade one set of problems for another. In doing so, they pose a serious threat to us all.
Ciao
Hub.
