Voici une réponse de la part d'un pilote vétéran sur F-16 et qui vole sur F-35 :
F-35 and air-to-air role
Published by Morten Hanche
June 2, 2017
Norway's fifth F-35 landed at the Luke Air Force Base in Arizona May 25, 2017 11.13 local time. PHOTO: Luke Air Force Base
In February, I was allowed to talk about F-35 during the annual Air Force Seminar at the Air War School in Trondheim. The order was F-35 and air-to-air role. I've written a part about F-35 and air combat in other blog posts. This post is a customized version of the lecture I held in Trondheim, and it has a slightly different angle. Initially, I summarize the performance perspective before I went into the most important part of the article: How should the Defense use the F-35 in air-to-air role? I think this is an important question, which we need to have good and clear answers to. In a larger perspective, I do not think it's smart to try to distinguish the air-to-air role from air to ground. The point must be that the Armed Forces must have a plan for how to use the F-35. I will return to this in a later post.
The term "fifth-level air defense" was repeated during the seminar. Even I'm a bit unsure of what it really means. Once I have used the phrase in the lecture, it was a very simple interpretation at the bottom: A "fifth generation air defense" is somewhat better - more effective - than we have today. Our graduates can certainly elaborate on this in the future. Here you have talked:
The king in the air
I've used a lot about F-35 before. Last time I felt something at Air War College, my background was to have read specifications, test reports and have flown simulator. Then I stated that the machine was formidable. Now I have flown the machine for a year and I'm glad to say; What did I say? F-35 is the king in the air!
I'll be a bit more precise: With full war equipment, my experience with F-35A is that
It's easier to fly than F-16.
It's faster than F-16.
It has a longer range than F-16.
It flies higher than F-16.
It is more maneuverable than F-16.
It finds opponents on a longer distance (than F-16 would have done).
Opponents discover F-35 later than an F-16 would be found.
And it looks tougher!
So what? Is it relevant to compare with F-16? It is not very likely that we meet a hostile F-16. The reason I compare with F-16 is because I know F-16 because F-16 is a mid-to-tree example of a "fourth generation" fighter plane and because rated sources make it difficult to compare directly with more current threats there out.
Let me give you some practical examples that I believe support my claims.
Winged crow
When I took the F-35 in the air for the first time, I immediately noticed that the airplane was easy to fly. The impression has only been stronger since then. The F-35 has a nice balance between soft and accurate response on one side, for example, when we fly in tight formation. On the other hand, the machine reacts quickly and violently when I need it, for example in close combat. In F-35, we sometimes prefer short-term low-speed combat because the F-35 lets you check reliably at lower speeds than I'm used to. Another side of the F-35 and ease of use is that it's easy to get up in the air and easy to land. This is especially evident when landing in crosswinds: F-16 is like a winged crow, which you have to watch all the way up to speed. In comparison, the F-35 is almost perceived as a train on rails.
Is it so important that the machine is easy to fly? Should not the pilots, with expensive education (and big ego) cope with a small challenge? It should be obvious that an airplane that is easy to use is safer to operate; The pilot gets more capital to plan ahead and can make better decisions. This is especially important with the F-35, since there are no two-seater seats for use in exercise. There will never be an instructor in a backseat, ready to save a dangerous situation. Good flying qualities are therefore a big advantage when we in a couple of years will bring fresh flyers home from Ever Summer in Arizona and a little worse and colder weather in Ørland. (I live there and know what I am talking about).
Supersonic speed
Most importantly, however, is that a machine that is easy to use gives the flyer more capital to make good combat technical decisions. Good decisions needed to solve the assignment. In other words, we get more "tactical currency" out of the weapon platform when the pilot does not plunder with the plane.
I want to tell you about another impression from my first flight in F-35, and that's the F-35 is a fast machine. F-35 keeps effortlessly high speed. Unlike the F-16, this also applies to weapons loads. The machine is so "happy" that we must make new F-35 pilots specially aware of this. The F-35 is upset if you do not follow. That's why it's not uncommon for a flyer without thinking it ends in supersonic speed!
In addition to being a fast machine, the F-35 is fast to accelerate - it accelerates well. It is clear in close combat. I can use the speed in exchange for a quick, instantaneous turn when I maneuver in relation to the opponent. Nonetheless, if I unload a little bit and give the plane a break, I quickly get back the speed. I can thus vary between crab and full sprint in a short period of time.
"El Gato"
I have been introduced to "El Gato" during the fall when he learned to fly F-35 with us. "Gato" is an experienced F / A-18 pilot who has gone through the weapons schools of both the US Marine Corps and the US Navy, also known as Top Gun. Let me quote El Gato, after his first flight in F-35A: "... it flies like a hornet, but with four engines ...". (In comparison, F-18 usually has two engines). Or to quote one of my Italian colleagues, after his first taste of F-35: "I did not think performance like this was possible." (Thus, in a positive sense.)
Is it important to fly quickly? Do not we have missiles flying quickly on our behalf? With an elongate country it is an advantage that we can keep high speed over a long period of time. We can fly from Ørland to Banak on the hour, and still have the opportunity to solve a mission. (We can not do that with F-16). Or, we can quickly be on the spot to help our colleagues on the hill or at sea.
In addition, high speed and high altitude are important in air combat. For the same reason as spear throwers take the highground, we take a run-by-plane [high energy?] with the plane; We give the missile higher total energy, which means more range. More reach means it's even more difficult for the opponent to "turn" away when the shot comes.
"Dogfight"
A controversial theme among (other) bloggers with strong opinions has been F-35 in close combat, or "dogfight". Many critics have been unilateraly negative to the F-35 in relation to the air-to-air role, especially in relation to close combat. I've read that F-35 is "a lemon", "a turkey" and "a failure". (Ie, negative). I want to ask a counter-question? Is it relevant to talk about "dogfight"? I think many people exaggerate the importance of close combat. My experience is that "dogfight" rarely involves two planes that actively fight against each other. More often, a party has an overview while the other unsuspecting becomes a victim. The victim is shot down without trying for a defensive maneuver. I think we'd rarely be the victim with F-35 but rather the one who surprises the opponent.
Whatever the background, let's assume that the "dogfight" is a fact. A year ago, we had so far begun to learn how we fought best match F-35. Now we have come a long way, and I have a different impression than the critics: I have found that F-35 is a maneuverable machine that causes serious trouble for F-16 and others when we meet in close combat. My experience is that it is easier to keep an offensive starting point, but also; That it's easier to turn a neutral or defensive starting point into offensive. What does this mean: If I were to be surprised at F-35, I still turn the battle to my advantage. If I find you first, F-35 hangs like a coat, and doesnt let you get away.
"You killed"
I would like to emphasize an important difference from F-16 in this context. F-16 at airshow is manoeuvrable and impressive, but F-16 with war equipment is "a mess". The F-35 on the other hand is maneuverable and fast also with war equipment. (The first time I flew with F-35 internal weapon load, I can honestly say I did not notice it on the machine.)
The battlefield in the air is a dangerous arena, which we want to keep away. F-35's greatest strength is clear in the ability to find and kill others before they have the opportunity to strike back. Still, if the missiles should fail, I'm out of missiles or if the opponent has the perfect remedy; Then I know that the F-35 is maneuverable and powerful enough to bite off in close combat as well as any other fighter plane out there.
Ninja in felt slippers
Before I go into the core of the lecture, I want to talk about low-observability and sensors. Some have claimed that signature is almost something mythical, or at least a vulnerable concept, which at best has limited validity. My experience is something else. The reference is essentially to have flown against F-16 in scenarios where F-16 had Ground Control Intercept. What happens then? Well, for a long time, I know exactly where the formation with F-16 is and I have plenty of time to plan the attack. The F-16, on its part, relies on being led all the way back to us, whether they will be able to take back. Nevertheless, the outcome is that every F-16 has been shot down without firing off a single shot in our direction. There is nothing ridiculous about this. It's a completely uneven match. It is as though you were being attacked on the streets by a camouflage-guided ninja in filthy trousers, jumping out from behind a bush and striking a bat. It's raw, brutal and totally surprising. Another experience is that we manage to sneak out undetected beyond the F-16 formation, if we wish. I have taken myself a little while I "list" me past our opponents in this way. It gives a special sense of supremacy: knowing that I can shoot you now, or now, but I do not. At the same time as the opponent can not recover.
Is this just bargain or do I have an important point? I think the combination of good sensors, low signature and high performance makes us better able to both solve the assignment and come home again. In other words, bag and bag! We get more "bang for the buck" with F-35 than with the F-16 (also) in the air-to-air role.
A complex arena
Before I move on, I warn against well-meaning critics its often binary interpretation: Air combat is a complex arena. My experience is that the world is not black and white, that a single performance parameter, a single requirement specification or a loose extract of a test report does not tell the whole story and that human being is probably the most important factor. "It depends" is an answer I often hear in discussion with other pilots. There is more to say about the F-35 in the air-to-air role, but we have to take it to the bar (where unrestricted boasts belongs).
I have tried to give you my user perspective on F-35. I hope I was clear that the F-35 is lethal in the air-to-air role. I'm sure (because I'm sure I would not like to meet F-35 in the air myself). Therefore, I also think the order of the subject was a bit frustrating: now it's time to believe us when we go again saying that the F-35 is effective in the air-to-air role. We must move on in the debate and address the most important question; How should we choose to use the F-35 in the counter-air role? As long as our political and military leaders do not have a finished answer to this, we do not have any five-generation Defense!
Control and alert chain
Norwegian military doctrine has had a strategic defensive and tactically offensive ambition. Strategically defensive is little controversial. Nor has there been much discussion about how we might try to act tactically offensive. I think it is because we have had little real ability to actually act aggressively. Poor survival means that the Armed Forces can not follow an offensive line with F-16. At least not in the face of an advanced opponent. Our old F-16 is particularly vulnerable to modern air defense systems, which in practice shut the airspace for us. The F-16's poor sensor capacity means that our F-16 is also fully dependent on the control and warning chain to be effective on mission.
Because the F-16 is so dependent on support from the control and warning chain, our F-16 has traditionally been "tight leashed" in terms of engagement rules and authority to deliver weapons. In practice, the pilot has received approval to engage each air goal. There are good reasons to keep a tight leash, not least to avoid unwanted political and strategic consequences, but also to avoid engaging other own forces.
Unlike the F-16, the F-35 has a robust ability to identify air targets on its own and with great accuracy. Before I move on, I track a bit to emphasize an important prerequisite: That we have an updated and validated electronic library in our F-35. The library describes both friendly and hostile radio transmitters of all kinds, such as radar. Set on the tip; An inaccurate electronic library causes the F-35 pilot to shoot down the passenger plane instead of the enemy combat plane. Therefore, I think the priority of just programming lab was an invaluable step towards a five-generation defense.
More authority for the cockpit
Back on track. Assuming a good electronic library and robust ability to identify goals on their own; Therefore, in a full war situation, greater authority should be delegated to the F-35 pilot. If strategic and operational management does not dare to delegate authority to "cockpit", and inverting our old action pattern, where the control and alert chain "approves" every shot, we will always be less effective than possible with the F-35. We will operate a fifth generation weapon platform in a third generation Defense.
Greater delegation of authority to "cockpit" also means that the control and warning chain has a slightly different role. There is less emphasis on control and more emphasis on alert than we are used to. (F-16 must, in practice, be led completely into the boxing ring, if there is to be any match. F-35 finds its own way from the wardrobe.) Since the F-35 only needs to be directed in the "general direction" We usually have little need to talk with the checkers on the ground. An updated situation picture, showing both land, sea and air targets, and shared over data links, is probably all that is needed. ("Voice Control" was the British already successful during the Battle of Britain.)
Greater trust from management
Another likely challenge for our command and control device is that F-35 may be the only sensor that tracks an air target. This may be because the control and warning chain does not have sensor coverage in the area or because the sensors are broken. Nevertheless, it brings again the issue of delegation of authority. Perhaps we have no other data on this goal, but the F-35 has identified it as hostile, with a high level of reliability. What decision should boss NAOC take? Should he be part of the process? Can he be part of the process, if the target is fleeting - think a cruise missile - or if F-35 is out of range?
Delegation of greater authority to the "cockpit" requires high trust from senior management (which will surely look after the F-35 squadrons as a sphere of "strategic" ensigns and lieutenants). Continuing good education lays the foundation for trust and delegation, but I doubt that education alone will bring us completely into purpose. I think it's important that senior management takes an active role and engages to learn and fully understand what F-35 brings. This understanding is essential for managers to dare to rely on system F-35. Without a greater degree of delegation, we will hardly be able to fully utilize the F-35.
New and important choices
This might be a slight downturn. Back to the air defense. Defensive contra-air with F-16, or air defense, we are well-known in Norway. F-16's poor sensor capacity and low survival rate made the F-16 a purely defensive resource for home-based use: We wait until the opponent reaches us and sends F-16 to engage the opponent's airplane, over Norway. (Hopefully before the payload is delivered). The target choice for our F-16 in the counter-air role is therefore self; We are chasing the enemy's airplanes. The planes are the goal. This is a reactive way of action, which forces the Armed Forces to keep high readiness over time. High preparedness requires large resources. (Has the Armed Forces great resources?) With F-35, and in the long term, Joint & Naval Strike Missile (JSM & NSM), this changes.
Good survival allows the F-35 to operate in areas that are closed to F-16. Good sensors mean that the F-35 can be effective also without the support of the control and warning chain. (In other words, not just "home"). Therefore, the F-35 gives our military and political leadership new and important choices. Choices that must be taken now, which must result in updated headings, attitudes, concepts and plans in government, ministry and operational headquarters. (If this does not happen, only squadrons are ready to be ready in 2019. Do we have a five-generation Defense?)
Contraindications Air
Our managers can choose to use the F-35 just the way we use F-16 today, as a kind of Super-16. (An F-16 on steroids). F-35 will do better in this role than F-16 today, but the behavior is still reactive, requires large resources and we have limited own target choices. (It's like using a modern PC only as an electric typewriter without ever logging in online. Not to mention a round of solitaire.)
With the F-35, our political and military leaders can for the first time choose to be tactically offensive. In a contra-air campaign, target selection only needs to be enemy aircraft in air, across Norway. We can choose to intervene in the opponent's chain on an earlier point. Within the framework of contra-air, natural targets can be command and control systems, opponent's airports with aircraft on the ground, runways and weapon bearings, or the opponent's logistics chain. It should be obvious that these goals can give greater effect to an opponent, especially over time. None of these choices are on the table with F-16 alone.
Most important means of action
If we choose to be more offensive in the use of air force, we are going on to a proactive role. It moves us away from a forced attrition war and will be an asset resource. Especially for Norway's small defense. An offensive approach forces the attacker to defend defensively.
A natural continuation of this mindset must be to clarify the role of F-35 in defense of Norway in a joint operational context. Not only air-to-air, and air power, in a vacuum. What should we prioritize, with limited number of aircraft available? Should we provide support for the army at Finnmarksvidda? Should we fly patrol over the frigates to the Navy? Can we do everything at the same time, or should FOH prioritize other goals that could give greater effect?
I do not arguing that Norway will only react aggressively. What will be the correct use of power in a given situation, it is up to our senior executives to decide. My point is that our managers have a job to do: Our leaders must think through the new freedom of choice, and find out when, where and how, F-35, as the military's most important force, should be used tactically offensive in defense of Norway. We do not have a five-generation defense before we have this answer crystal clear.
